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Street-based militant groups on the far right, in particular those with a revolutionary outlook, 
usually emerge within nation-states and only rarely operate transnationally. However, over the 
past decade, there have been two notable exceptions to this rule in Europe: The Nordic 
Resistance Movement (NRM), originating in Sweden; and Generation Identity (GI), 
originating in France. Both groups are regularly described by experts and journalists as some 
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Abstract 
Street-based militant groups on the far right usually emerge within nation-states 
and only rarely operate transnationally. However, over the past decade, there have 
been two notable exceptions to this rule in Europe: The Nordic Resistance 
Movement, originating in Sweden; and Generation Identity, originating in France. 
Both groups are regularly described as some of the most influential of their kind 
but have received limited academic attention and are often portrayed rather 
crudely by the media. Thus, to inform future research, policy-making, and 
preventive work, this article outlines the ideological foundation of each group, 
traces their national origins and transnational evolution, compares their ideologies, 
strategies, organization, and types of action, and discusses how government and 
local authorities can deal with militant protest groups in a way that discourages 
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of the most influential of their kind. However, the NRM and GI have received limited 
academic attention to date and are often portrayed rather crudely by the media. Therefore, this 
article offers a thorough introduction of both groups to inform future research, policy-making, 
and preventive work.  
Transnational street militancy refers here to militant groups and organizations whose 
political activism is predominantly street-based and who operate in multiple countries 
simultaneously within the same organizational framework. Studying transnational street 
militancy can be rewarding for several reasons. First, unlike more conventional forms of 
transnational activism, such as transnational exchanges of ideas and practices (Macklin, 
2013), or the development of transnational online networks (Caiani & Kröll, 2015), 
transnational street militancy implies a physical presence aiming to disturb or disrupt the 
prevailing political system, thereby compelling a governmental response of some kind. 
Second, unlike non-militant protest movements operating transnationally, such as PEGIDA 
(Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016), militant groups are far more confrontational, position 
themselves in legal grey zones, and actively seek out situations that from a governmental 
perspective can be highly demanding not only legally but also tactically and politically. 
Finally, by operating in multiple countries simultaneously, these groups are in a good position 
to become more influential both locally, nationally and transnationally than they otherwise 
would have been. They also benefit from having access to resources, expertise and skill-sets 
from a wide range of people in different countries working toward the same goal and within 
the same organizational framework. Therefore, transnational street militancy presents unique 
challenges to anyone tasked to prevent political violence and extremism. 
There are also good reasons for studying the NRM and GI in particular. First, both 
groups are amongst the most prominent examples of street-based militant groups operating at 
the transnational level. Second, both groups have drawn considerable international attention 
recently. However, with such increased attention comes an increase in misguided descriptions 
and threat assessments. Therefore, a comprehensive introduction to both groups is needed, 
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associated with terrorism. In 2017, one member and two former (but recent) members of the 
NRM were charged with three bombing attacks in Gothenburg (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2020). 
These and other events led high ranking officials in the United States to suggest including the 
NRM on the official US list of foreign terrorist organizations (Garza, 2019). Then, in 2019, a 
lone actor who drew ideological inspiration from GI and had donated money to several GI 
divisions brutally attacked two mosques in the city of Christchurch in New Zealand (Macklin, 
2019). Although the perpetrator was never a member of GI, the attacks led both social media 
platforms and governments to impose severe repressive measures against the organisation. 
For example, many public GI profiles on Facebook and Twitter were removed, and the 
German government has gradually changed its view of GI from initially not being seen as 
extreme-right at all, to being included in official intelligence reports as a potential case of 
right-wing extremism, to being fully classified as an extreme-right organization with 
permanent monitoring by the intelligence apparatus. However, considering the ostensibly 
non-violent profile of GI, one may question whether such repressive measures are in line with 
fundamental liberal democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and freedom of 
association, and whether the long-term effects of these measures will be more or less 
extremism and violence?  
To contribute to more informed assessments of such difficult yet important questions, 
this article provides answers to the following questions: First, what characterizes the 
transnational evolution, ideology, strategy, organization and action repertoires of the NRM 
and GI? Second, how do these elements compare between the two organizations? And third, 
how can governments and local authorities deal with militant protest groups in a way that 
discourages extremism and violence, while at the same time safeguarding liberal democratic 
principles? 
To answer these questions, the article is divided into five parts. I begin by briefly 
outlining key concepts and methods used in this study. Part two outlines the ideological 
foundation of each group: National Socialism in the case of the NRM; and Identitarianism in 
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Part four compares their ideologies, strategies, organization, and types of action. Finally, in 
part five, I draw on these findings to offer six concrete advice for those tasked to prevent 
violence and extremism. 
 
Concepts and methods 
 
Two key concepts used in this article warrants a clarification because their meanings vary 
across different countries: militancy and extremism. I use the term militant in this study 
because both the NRM and GI describe themselves as militants. Militancy is therefore an 
important feature of these groups’ self-perception and self-styled public appearances. 
However, one should be aware that militancy has somewhat different connotations in their 
countries of origin. In Sweden and Northern Europe more broadly, militants are usually 
understood as activists demonstrating a willingness to use violence in pursuit of their political 
goals. In France, the term militant is used more generally and may refer to anyone involved in 
some form non-conventional political activism with a passionate slant. These differences 
notwithstanding, the NRM and GI appear to attach quite similar meanings to their self-styled 
militancy; an understanding that falls somewhere in between these two interpretations. Here, I 
propose four shared elements of these groups’ self-styled militancy.  
First, it appears that being a militant in the eyes of the NRM and GI entails a 
considerable degree of personal devotion, part of which is to accept the ideological platform 
or general worldview of the group. In practise, this means that group members are expected to 
adhere to a given ideological script developed by the group leadership or other ideological 
authorities, and that questioning this script is generally not appreciated, at least not publicly. 
A second element of militancy is organization, meaning that the term “militant” usually refers 
to activists with a formal membership to a militant group. Third, there appears to be an 
element of confrontational direct action in the ways the NRM and GI depict their militancy. 
In other words, they seek political change directly though provocative public acts rather than 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
petitions. Finally, militancy entails more for the NRM and GI than personal devotion, 
organization, and confrontational direct action. It is also seen as a way of life that may close 
some doors, but open others. By choosing the militant way, you may lose access to a 
comfortable “normie” life and perhaps also to material goods, including your job. In return, 
you get to know your true self, to experience emotions and pursue instincts that have been 
suppressed and denounced by modern societies, to fight for a just cause, to be part of a strong 
and unified collective, to make a difference, to matter. 
Just like militancy, extremism is a contested term that carry different meanings in 
different countries. Because of its contested nature, I generally avoid using the term in this 
article, except for in my final discussion of how government and local authorities can deal 
with militant protest groups in a way that discourages violence and extremism. When 
referring to extremism here, I rely on the most established conceptualization from the 
literature on extremism and democracy more broadly, seeing extremism as being essentially 
anti-democratic, as opposed to other forms of radical protest that nevertheless follow 
democratic rules and procedures (Mudde, 2007, pp. 24–26). In addition, I distinguish between 
extremist (anti-democratic) ideas, which in most Western democracies is considered legal as 
long as they do not breach specific laws such as hate crime legislation, and extremist (anti-
democratic) behavior, such as illegal use of violence or other types of unlawful or anti-
democratic behavior.   
The chosen method for this article is the comparative case study by way of Structured 
Focused Comparison as proposed by George (1979). This method “is ‘structured’ in that the 
researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that each question is 
asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making 
systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings possible. The method is ‘focused’ in 
that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (George & Bennett, 
2005: 67).  
The questions asked for this study concerns the ideology, transnational evolution, 
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data have been collected from multiple sources. First and foremost, the study relies on 
primary sources such as documents and propaganda produced by the groups themselves, 
including manifestos, books, magazines, pamphlets, manuals, online webpages, and videos. 
Second, a handful of interviews and informal talks have been conducted with people who 
know either one of these organizations particularly well, including former activists, anti-
fascist activists, journalists and police officers. Third, the author has on several occasions 
been doing participant observation of the NRMs public protest events and demonstrations in 
Norway and Sweden. While immersing myself with or nearby the activists during such public 
events, I never pretend to be one of them, and most likely looked like a journalist taking 
photographs. I was also open about my background and reasons for being there if asked by the 
police or the activists themselves. Finally, the study also relies on secondary sources such as 




Before comparing the ideological platforms of the NRM and GI, it is useful to look at the 
broader ideological traditions they draw upon. While the NRM presents itself as a fully-
fledged National Socialist organization, GI adheres to a newer ideological current, generally 
referred to as Identitarianism. The following outline briefly presents key features of each of 
these two ideological traditions.  
National Socialism 
National Socialism is generally understood as the ideology developed and practiced by the 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) founded in 1920, a development that 
culminated in NSDAP’s rise to power in 1933, and ended in the closing days of WWII in 
1945.  
Arguably the most influential account of National Socialism is laid out in the two-
volume Mein Kampf, which Adolf Hitler began to write while imprisoned for a failed coup 
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manifesto. In the beginning, Hitler describes how, as a young adult, he went from having a 
generally positive attitude towards the Jews to becoming fiercely anti-Semitic. This anti-
Semitism was premised on a biological form of racism, i.e. the idea that humans can be 
divided into races with substantively different physical and mental qualities, and then ranked 
according to their value. For example, Hitler regarded the Jews as an intellectually resourceful 
but inherently selfish and devilish people, seeking to dominate the world. According to Hitler, 
Jews therefore constituted the greatest threat to the survival of other races, including his own 
“Aryan master race”.  
The supposed superiority of the Aryan master race is another key feature of National 
Socialism. Hitler saw Aryans first and foremost as morally and culturally superior, and 
therefore believed other races would benefit from being ruled by them. But Hitler also feared 
that the clever Jews might deceive credulous and good-hearted Aryans into suppressing their 
own superiority through political constructs promoting egalitarianism, most notably Marxism.  
Hitler’s fear of Jews and Marxism, and the racially biological thinking these fears are 
premised upon, constitute the ideological foundation for how “nationalism” and “socialism” 
are understood in National Socialism. Importantly, National Socialists reject conventional 
nationalism as being too conservative and backward leaning, as opposed to the progressive 
race-based nationalism promoted by Hitler and NSDAP. National Socialists also reject 
conventional socialism for being too internationally oriented (or anti-nationalist) and for 
discrediting racial differences. The socialist element of National Socialism relates mainly to 
the ambition of serving the (German) people – which at that time comprised many industrial 
workers – before anyone else.  
This juxtaposition of race, people, and nation – blood and soil – ties into a final key 
feature of National Socialism that has more to do with its philosophical foundations than with 
politics. National Socialism can also be understood as a form of (political) religion, that is, a 
holistic worldview offering answers to existential questions about the meaning of life, the 
human condition, divinity, and nature. As such, National Socialism generally rejects the 
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divinity is found in the present world, in nature. Humans are seen as a small but integral part 
of a much larger organic whole, a divine nature with its own rules and dynamics. It is only by 
accepting the laws of nature that humans can fulfill their potential through a mythical 
connection between people and nature. These laws of nature are in turn interpreted through a 
Darwinian lens in which principles such as natural selection, survival of the fittest, and a 
biological understanding of race and organic evolution rule. As a result, meaning in life is 
achieved by contributing to the survival of your race, which is in harsh competition with other 
enemy races. This eternal life struggle implies an appreciation of values such as vitalism, 
personal sacrifice, affection, virtue, aggression, instinct, death, and force, and of violent 
destruction for the sake of creating something new and better.  
Identitarianism 
Although GI activists call themselves Identitarians, they are skeptical about the term 
“Identitarianism” because they consider being an Identitarian to be more about following a 
(militant) way of life than about subscribing to a specific political ideology. When people 
speak of Identitarians today, they often trace their intellectual heritage back to the French 
Nouvelle Droite or New Right school of thought.  
Several key features characterize the New Right school of thought, and therefore also 
the Identitarian mindset. First, New Right thinkers emphasize the importance of collective 
identities and communitarian bonds for human well-being. Such collective identities are in 
turn perceived as closely tied to ethnic and territorial belonging, or to being “rooted” as the 
Identitarians like to say. Because identity is seen as inseparable from ethnicity and territory, 
people from different places are, by definition, different. This diversity, however, is 
celebrated by New Right thinkers and portrayed as a value that should be preserved. The 
concept of “ethnopluralism” is sometimes used to describe this idea – that people of different 
ethnic and territorial backgrounds should co-exist separately rather than being mixed, in order 
to preserve their unique qualities and collective identities. 
The New Right community sees liberalism as their main enemy. One reason is liberal 
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celebrated by the New Right. A second reason relates to liberal universalism, which conflicts 
with the ethnopluralist conception of healthy societies that the New Right wants to preserve. 
A third reason is economic, and concerns neo-liberal ideas about free markets and a 
competition-based economy. On this issue, the New Right places itself more to the left than to 
the right. For example, the New Right is against the capitalist logic of everlasting growth and 
productivity, and seeks to reduce the importance of capital, money, and work “in order to 
have some time for oneself and enjoy life” (de Benoist & Champetier, 2012, p. 42). 
While it is true that contemporary Identitarians are deeply inspired by New Right 
ideas, it is also true that Identitarians in many ways represent a break with the original New 
Right community (Zúquete, 2018, p. 12). Because Identitarian ideas have recently been 
appropriated by a range of actors across the world, including the Alt-right movement in the 
United States, it is perhaps more difficult now than before to give a precise description of 
Identitarianism. However, a handful of ideas can still be found among most self-identifying 
Identitarians, often revolving around a set of concepts used to promote these ideas. One such 
concept is “The Great Replacement”, which refers to the prospect of ethnic European 
populations (or white Americans) being outnumbered in their “own” countries by people with 
non-Western immigrant backgrounds.  
To reverse this replacement, Identitarians have introduced the concept “Remigration”, 
referring to the idea of introducing a series of non-violent incentives to stimulate a 
“voluntary” departure of non-Western immigrants back to their homelands. Although most 
Identitarians agree that remigration is necessary, there is less agreement about how exactly 
this is to be achieved. Proposed incentives range from giving immigrants money to facilitate 
their return, to making life so miserable for Muslims that they ultimately decide to leave the 
country (in-person interview with former GI activist, Oslo, 14 May 2018).  
A related concept is “Reconquista”, referring to the confrontational idea of retaking 
territory from Muslim invaders. The term has its historical roots in the period between 711 
and 1491, when Arab and Berber forces gained control over large parts of the Spanish 
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united forces and started fighting back, ultimately regaining the entire peninsula. For the 
Identitarians, this territorial metaphor is also associated with the establishment of so-called 
Identity houses, which are occupied buildings serving as “safe spaces” or “rebel zones”, 
where Identitarian patriots can live out their white ethnic identities (Zúquete, 2018, pp. 61–
62).  
These cultural practices tie into a final key feature of Identitarianism, which has to do 
with the lived experience of being a militant, and, relatedly, the aestheticization of the 
revolutionary struggle. Doing something, but also doing it elegantly and provocatively, has 
become a trademark of the Identitarians. Much like militant anarchist groups, they seek a 
form of personal emancipation and empowerment through militant activism (see Zúquete, 
2018, pp. 42–47 for a longer exposé of this element of Identitarian militancy). 
 
National origins and transnational evolution  
 
The Nordic Resistance Movement 
The establishment of the NRM (then known as the Swedish Resistance Movement) was 
announced in the third issue of the newspaper Folktribunen (The People’s Tribune) in 
December 1997. Folktribunen’s editor-in-chief and one of NRM’s founders was Klas Lund, 
who headed the organization for 18 years between 1997 and 2015, a rare achievement in these 
circles.  
Lund has become something of a mythic figure within the organization. Apart from his 
lengthy leadership, Lund’s status ties into a series of dramatic events that preceded NRM’s 
establishment. Lund began his activist career as a skinhead, a form of activism the NRM 
normally distances itself from because it wants to emphasize political struggle over 
subcultural practices. In 1986, when Lund was 18 years old, he and a group of fellow 
skinheads beat and kicked to death a young man who had allegedly attempted to stop them 
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skinheads were convicted for murder and received eight-year prison sentences. Lund’s 
sentence was later reduced to four years, and he was released after only two.  
Upon his release from prison, Lund was eager to leave behind his skinhead 
misdemeanors and get involved in true revolutionary struggle. Together with a handful of 
other activists, he established the network Vitt Ariskt Motstånd (VAM, White Aryan 
Resistance), deeply inspired by revolutionary and terrorism-inciting publications and groups 
from the United States, such as The Turner Diaries, Hunter, and The Order. To prepare for 
this armed revolution, and in line with The Turner Diaries script, Lund and his associates 
robbed banks to finance their activities. However, one of these robberies landed them in 
prison and ended the revolution before it had even begun.  
While in prison, Lund had plenty of time (six years, only interrupted by a short prison 
escape to Norway) to contemplate the means that would be most effective in generating a 
revolutionary outcome. Rather than promoting a loosely organized network of leaderless 
resistance fighters, Lund decided that a strong hierarchical elite-organization was needed. 
These thoughts were further developed in the newspaper Folktribunen, which Lund created 
after his second release from prison. Folktribunen thus became the NRM’s first official media 
outlet, following the announcement of NRM’s establishment in December 1997.  
The NRM is a militant National Socialist organization, aiming to create a Nordic 
nation for the Nordic people. Today, the organization has active divisions in Sweden, Finland, 
Norway and Denmark. In Norway, a first attempt to establish the organization took place in 
Norway in 2003, when former members of the Norwegian skinhead group Boot Boys became 
sworn members of NRM’s first Norwegian branch. A photo from this symbolic event is on 
the cover of the second issue of Nationell Motsånd, the second official publication of the 
NRM, which replaced Folktribunen in 2003. However, recruiting dedicated activists in 
Norway proved harder than in Sweden, and after a couple of years the first Norwegian branch 
of NRM ceased its activities.  
It was to take several years before a second attempt was made to re-establish the 
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Norwegian member. He was soon promoted to leader of a resurrected Norwegian branch and 
given the task of rebuilding a Norwegian activist network. Later that year, a Norwegian 
version of NRM’s website – Nordfront – went online, mainly containing articles from the 
Swedish site translated into Norwegian. However, slowly but surely, activism reports began 
appearing on the Norwegian website as well, usually about night-time sticker raids. From 
2016 onwards, Norwegian activists started carrying out a number of public activities, 
including a relatively large demonstration in Kristiansand in July 2017. This sharp increase in 
activity level appears to reflect a similar increase in Sweden, following the leadership change 
in 2015. At the same time, the number of activists involved in the Norwegian division has 
been kept well under 50 and does not seem to be growing.  
In Finland, the NRM’s Finnish branch, Suomen vastarintaliike (The Finnish 
Resistance Movement), was established by Esa Henrik Holappa in 2008. Holappa has today 
left the organization and is considered by the NRM as a traitor and oath breaker. Compared to 
the Norwegian division, the Finnish branch has been more active publicly and also involved 
in several severe violent episodes including knife stabbings, tear gas attacks and severe 
beatings. In 2018, the Finnish branch was prohibited following an episode where a person 
who verbally confronted NRM activists was brutally kicked to the ground and died one week 
later, most likely of injuries relating to this attack. Before being prohibited, the Finnish branch 
counted less than a hundred active members, but appeared to be growing and was active in at 
least five different locations (in-person interviews with a local anti-racist activist in Helsinki, 
June 2014, and with Holappa in Oslo, May 2016).  
The most recent addition to the NRM’s transnational network (not counting a handful 
of activists in Iceland) is the Danish branch, (re)established in 2017 (Nordfront, 2017). Just as 
in Norway in 2003, an earlier attempt at establishing a Danish branch was made in 2013, 
headed by a former member of Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Bevægelse (Denmark’s 
Nationalist Socialist Movement, DNSB). However, apart from a few sticker raids suspiciously 
close to the Swedish border, few activities followed, and the Danish NRM-branch soon 
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The re-establishment of the Danish branch in 2017 appears to be more promising for 
the NRM. One reason why the 2013-attempt failed might have been the presence of a 
somewhat similar organization in Denmark at that time: Danmarks Nationale Front 
(Denmark’s National Front, DNF). Since then, however, the activities of DNF have receded 
considerably, reaching a historical low in 2018 (Redox, 2018). In addition, Danskernes parti 
(The Party of the Danes), initially founded by former DNSB members and regularly accused 
for harboring National Socialist sympathies, dissolved in 2017, leaving some of its members 
in search for a new activist platform.  
A final critical development occurred in 2019, when a group of activists headed by 
Klas Lund, including the leader of the Norwegian division Haakon Forwald, left the Swedish 
and Norwegian divisions to establish a new group known as Nordisk Styrke (Nordic Strength). 
The split was according to members of the new group based on internal disagreements about 
strategy, mainly concerning whether the group should continue pursuing mainstream types of 
activities such as large public demonstrations and maintaining a political party, or rather focus 
on operating in a semi-clandestine fashion, as the NRM used to do. It is too early to tell what 
to make of this new group at the time of writing. However, the fact that it is being headed by 
Klas Lund and that several key activists followed him suggests that it could become a potent 
contender to the NRM.  
 
Generation Identity 
On July 14, 2002, 25-year-old Maxime Brunerie attempted to assassinate the French President 
Jacques Chirac, firing two shots with a .22 rifle towards Chirac, who was approaching in a 
motorcade parade during the French national day (Bastille Day). Brunerie was at the time a 
member of the revolutionary nationalist group Unité Radicale, subsequently banned by 
French authorities for promoting discrimination, violent threats against foreigners, and anti-
Semitism.  
In the wake of Unité Radicale’s dissolution, several new groups were established by 
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Bloc – European Social Movement). This new group self-identifying as Identitarian drew 
much of its ideological inspiration from the writings of New Right dissidents such as 
Guillaume Faye and Dominique Venner. Before the establishment of Bloc Identitaire, the 
revolutionary nationalist scene in France had been characterized by an ever-changing 
conglomerate of small grouplets, or groupuscules, continually changing names, alliances, and 
outlooks, and never really managing to unite forces or develop a strong unifying organization 
(Bale, 2002; Griffin, 1999, 2003). In several ways, Bloc Identitaire changed this pattern, as 
the organization and its network have continued to expand and develop over the years. 
According to a founding member, “the goal was to break away from a sectarian logic and 
outmoded models and create both a new language of activism and a renovated strategy of 
propaganda” (quoted in Zúquete, 2018, p. 29). Today, the movement is simply known as Les 
Identitaires (The Identitarians) and claims at least two thousand members in France (Les 
Identitaires, 2016). However, its youth organization Generation Identitaire (Generation 
Identity) is currently making the most notable impact on the international scene. 
Initially called Jeunesses Idenitaire (Identitarian Youths) and then Une Autre Jenuesse 
(Another Youth), this youth organization was founded in 2002 and then fused with Bloc 
Identitaire. However, it was only when they relaunched the organization in 2012 under the 
new label Generation Identitaire and published a video-manifesto on YouTube entitled “A 
Declaration of War” that the group gained international attention. Shortly thereafter, GI 
activists “occupied” the rooftop of a mosque construction site in Poitiers (where Charles 
Martel had defeated an invading Muslim Moorish force in 732) and published several 
dramatized videos of this publicity stunt. Together with the initial YouTube manifesto, these 
videos quickly went viral and introduced the Identitarian label and its stylish form of 
militancy to audiences far beyond France.  
As a result of these successful media stunts, new GI-divisions began to pop up all 
across Europe, the first ones being formed in Austria and Germany in 2012 under the label 
Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian Movement). Today, GI has active divisions in many 
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Poland, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Unlike the NRM’s transnational evolution, which 
seems to have been under the auspices of the Swedish leadership, GI’s transnational evolution 
follows a franchise logic, where basically anyone can set up their own local GI division by 
drawing on GI’s original label, style, and ideology. Yet all divisions must be formally 





Ideologically, the NRM belongs to what one might call the Old Right and GI to the New 
Right. The Old Right is here understood as the ideological currents that underpinned the 
Fascist and National Socialist regimes during the interwar period, most notably in Italy and 
Germany. Following the Allies’ victory in WWII and growing public awareness about the 
Holocaust, ideas and values associated with these Old Right regimes, such as ultra-
nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racism, became sacrilege and entirely impossible to promote 
politically in Europe.  
However, behind toxic concepts such as Fascism, National Socialism, and anti-
Semitism, lay deeper, more general, but also less controversial ideas and values such as anti-
modernism, anti-liberalism, collectivism, communitarianism, and the idea that people’s 
identities and life-meanings are closely tied to the territories, peoples, and cultures to which 
they naturally “belong”. The self-given mandate of the New Right is to reinvigorate such 
ideas and values, while at the same time maintaining a safe distance to the toxic elements of 
the Old Right. Accordingly, a number of fundamental ideas and values are shared by the 
NRM and GI, and they also share many of the same political enemies. One should therefore 
not be surprised that three of the most high-profile GI leaders – Fabrice Robert and Phillippe 
Vardon from France, and Martin Sellner from Austria – all share a past in groups and milieu 
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That said, there are of course a number of important ideological differences between 
the NRM and GI. First and foremost, there is “the Jewish question” and that of race. While 
the NRM insists on maintaining these two controversial elements at their ideological core, GI 
is desperate to rid itself of such associations. However, this is easier said than done. For 
example, while GI considers racism and ethnocentric patriotism as fundamentally different, 
others see the two as different expressions of the same idea: that some people should have 
precedence over others in certain territories, simply because of their racial or ethnic descent.  
Turning to “the Jewish question”, the ideological differences between the NRM and GI are 
clearer. GI’s rejection of anti-Semitism comes across as credible, and is also backed up by 
publications from ideological authorities. One example is Guillaume Faye’s book La nouvelle 
question juive (The new Jewish question), in which Faye argues that, rather than obsessing 
about the Jews, the defenders of Europe must now turn their attention towards Islam (Faye, 
2007).  
This brings us to another ideological difference between the NRM and GI, which is 
how they relate to Islam and Muslims. For GI, the so-called Islamization of Europe represents 
a primary challenge to be dealt with, and while they may not be obsessed with Jews, they do 
seem to be obsessed with Muslims. In contrast, although the NRM is concerned with 
challenges posed by growing Muslim populations in Europe, they always make sure to remind 
themselves and others that the real cause of this “Muslim invasion” is the Jews, who have 
deliberately masterminded it in order to weaken European peoples and nations for their own 
benefit (Lund, 2004).  
Besides obsessions with Jews and Muslims, religion does not occupy much space in 
the ideological production of the NRM and GI. The NRM do claim to support religious 
freedom in their political manifesto. They also draw on pagan myths and symbols in some of 
their propaganda, in particular Norse mythology. For example, their main symbol is 
constituted by an overlay of the Tiwaz/Tyr rune, named after the warrior god Tyr, and the 
Yngvi/Ing rune, named after the Yngling lineage, the oldest known Scandinavian dynasty. GI 
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modern expression of Christianity and seem equally or more interested in Paganism. Their 
main symbol is the Greek letter Lambda, which figured on the shields of the warrior Spartans, 
and symbolizes a determination never to give up when defending one’s people.  
When it comes to family and gender, the NRM embody a traditional view where 
women are expected to take care of children and other womanly duties while men are 
expected to be frontline activists and warriors. For example, during participatory field work at 
NRM protests and demonstrations, the author has on several occasions observed that when 
violent confrontations are about to erupt, the leaders command the women to step back, and 
the women subsequently function as nurses taking care of wounded frontline activists, even 
bringing their own nursing kits. By contrast, GI has in most countries a more progressive view 
on family and gender, and female activists usually operate in tandem with male activists.  
Another ideological difference worth noting is how the NRM and GI relate to 
democracy. While the NRM explicitly rejects democratic rule and envisions a more 
authoritarian system, headed by strong and competent National Socialist “senators” (Lund, 
2010), GI tends to portray themselves as even more democratic than current Western 
democracies. However, GI’s conception of democracy is quite shallow and differs 
considerably from dominant conceptions among democracy theorists. As stated in one of the 
most widely distributed leaflets on GI’s ideological platform:  
 
Superficially it would appear that both our generations stand for at least one common cause. At least on 
one point we agree: in our passionate commitment to the principle of the rule of the people, democracy. 
In the end, however, we agree on nothing more than a word. It becomes clear soon enough that we 
understand something entirely different by the word democracy. When we think of democracy, the 
image of Athens and the right to participate in the community’s decisions come to mind. We strongly 
believe that the people have a right not only to participate in these decisions, but to make them entirely 
on their own accord. Direct democracy and referenda are our ideals. When we say democracy, we really 
mean democracy. 
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A core theme in normative democratic theory is how to avoid majoritarian mob rule, 
considering that the aim of democracy is balancing liberty and equality for all law-abiding 
members of society (Christiano, 2018). In contrast to this perspective, GI’s conception of 
democracy contains one principle only – majoritarian rule, operationalized as a system of 
direct democracy. 
A final ideological difference concerns the extent to which activists are expected to 
adhere to a given ideological script. As a member of the NRM, you are expected to embrace 
everything the organization stands for, including conspiracy theories about Jewish elites 
trying to control the world and homosexuality being an unnatural and confused state of mind. 
This form of militancy borders on fanaticism, i.e., on an uncritical ideological devotion. In 
fact, NRM activists regularly and proudly present themselves as fanatics, much in line with 
prominent National Socialists from the Third Reich, such as the SS-troops. GI does not 
promote such fanaticism, and their ideological script comes across as less rigid and more open 
for discussion and individual interpretation.  
 
Strategy 
The political goals of the NRM and GI are quite similar: the establishment and preservation of 
ethno-societies. In the case of the NRM, the main ambition is to create a Nordic nation for the 
Nordic people. GI’s dream society is somewhat less pronounced and more complex, because 
they operate with triple identities at the local, national, and regional or pan-European levels, 
and wish to cater for all of these simultaneously. To simplify, GI seeks more local autonomy, 
in accordance with local customs, culture, and needs. At the same time, they seek to preserve 
national identities by repatriating all or most people of foreign descent. Finally, they seek to 
replace the European Union, which they see as a liberal-capitalist-technocratic threat to the 
authentic European identity, with an autonomous European geopolitical alliance. Notably, this 
alliance should be detached from the current economic, cultural, and military grip of the 
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If we look at the strategies used by the NRM and GI to reach these stated goals, they 
are in fact surprisingly similar, although with slightly different configurations. Both groups 
operate mainly in the extra-parliamentary space, and they aim to influence how people think. 
Furthermore, this influence is to be achieved mainly through two types of activism: 
metapolitics and direct action. Which one of these two strategies has primacy over the other is 
not entirely clear for either group.  
As explained above, the establishment of the NRM can be seen as a reaction to a 
poorly organized “leaderless” movement with little direction, whose actions and terrorist 
ambitions did not really cater to its states political goals. At present, the NRM’s core task is to 
use propaganda and (mostly legal) direct action to “awaken” the people and prepare them for 
the upcoming “race war”. As such, one could see the present NRM as quite metapolitical in 
its orientation. However, an internal conflict about the primacy of metapolitics vs. direct 
action led to an organizational split in 2001, in which those oriented toward intellectual or 
metapolitical struggle left the organization, while those oriented towards direct action 
remained. Much in line with the general National Socialist emphasis on action rather than 
intellectualism, the NRM sees itself as an action-oriented vanguard in which ideology is 
meant to serve the struggle, and not the other way around (The Nordic Resistance Movement, 
2018, p. 41).  
GI’s point of departure is in a way the opposite: GI and the Identitarian movement 
more broadly can be seen as a reaction to an intellectual form of metapolitics which involves 
a lot of thinking and talking, but not much doing. For many prominent GI activists, it appears 
that action and life as a militant are equally or more important than the ideology itself, which 
is why they see themselves first and foremost as a “fighting community”. As one of GI’s 
founders Philippe Vardon stated: “We are more loyal to attitudes than to ideas” (quoted in 
Zúquete, 2018, p. 38). At the same time, metapolitics remains GI’s main strategy, and their 
“fight” is primarily a cultural, not a physical, one. All activities are streamlined towards the 
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Organization 
Because the NRM envisions an actual take-over of the government, it needs a hierarchical 
organization on stand-by when this critical moment arrives. In the case of GI, a less rigid, less 
hierarchical, and more network-centric organizational structure makes sense, considering that 
their metapolitical struggle is meant to take place at many different places, over long stretches 
of time, through many different channels, and involving many different types of actors. 
Therefore, GI is designed as an open and inclusive network of locally based groups with 
horizontal structures. To be sure, GI divisions also have their leaders, both locally and 
nationally. However, they are nowhere close to the hierarchical logic that permeates the 
NRM, in which advances in the hierarchy are important rewards for personal sacrifice and 
dedication to the struggle.  
In Sweden, the NRM currently consists of seven sub-divisions – or nests (nästen – a 
term borrowed from the Romanian Iron Guard) – covering different regions of Sweden. In 
addition, they have a national council (Riksrådet) as well as a Nordic council (Nordenrådet) 
comprising members from the various national branches. The entire structure is organized 
hierarchically. For example, each nest has a nest leader and deputy. Some nests consist of so-
called “combat groups” (kampgrupp), with their own respective leaders. At the top of the 
hierarchy is the leader of the entire organization, currently Simon Lindberg. Besides these top 
positions, there are several other prestigious positions within the organization, such as 
operational leader, parliamentary leader, media spokesperson, editor-in-chief, news editor, 
head of radio broadcasting, etc.  
By contrast, GI draws inspiration from leftist anarchist and autonomous movements, 
characterized by fundamentally different organizational principles, in which hierarchical, and 
thereby authoritarian, structures are seen as anathema. Here, an essential idea is to “live now 
the world you want to create”, for example by squatting in empty houses and establishing 
autonomous free zones, or “Identity houses”. It is up to each individual to enter this 
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structures. As such, GI is relatively unique compared to most contemporary far-right groups 
(Richards, 2019). The result is a network-centric organization, comprising local autonomous 
groups with their own particular styles, outlooks, and modes of operation, all within, of 
course, a broad Identitarian frame.  
Another organizational difference between the NRM and GI can be found in the types 
of people they recruit. While the NRM typically recruits adults with a vocational background, 
GI typically recruits young university students. One reason may be that the style of each 
group is quite different. The NRM displays a grounded, rural, family-oriented, caring, and 
authoritarian style. In contrast, GI’s style is rebellious, urban, youth-oriented, carefree, and 
anti-authoritarian.  
Finally, the number of dedicated activists involved is considerably smaller for the 
NRM than for GI. While the Swedish NRM branch currently claims a few hundred members, 
there were fewer than a hundred in Finland, and fewer than 50 in Norway. That said, the 
NRM’s website appears to have a considerable readership – between 300,000 and 400,000 
unique visitors per month, according to their own estimates (The Nordic Resistance 
Movement, 2018, p. 133).  
GI operates with a rough estimate of more than two thousand members in France alone 
(Les Identitaires, 2016), and all together the entire transnational network probably amounts to 
a few thousand dedicated activists. These numbers notwithstanding, compared to most other 
political movements, the NRM and GI remain marginal. To compensate for their lack of 
numbers, one important tactic is therefore to carry out spectacular stunts to draw the public 
eye, as the next section shows. 
 
Action repertoires 
In line with National Socialist thinking that humans are a small part of a larger organic whole 
– a divine nature – many of NRM’s internal activities consist of outdoors activities such as 
forest and mountain trips. Besides these trips, the NRM also organize annual summer camps 
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events related to festivities, weddings, and births. Such events give activists a feeling of being 
part of a community. For some activists, this community might even function as an extended 
or alternative family, considering that several had to break ties with their original families 
because of their political activism.  
The NRM’s most regular external activity is sticker and flyer raids, which often occur 
at night. In addition, NRM activists carry out flyer distributions in public squares during the 
daytime. From time to time, the NRM also carries out protest events addressing specific 
topics. Previously, NRM activists would regularly sell their magazines to the public (today’s 
media production is mainly online). Another regular activity consists of hanging up large 
NRM banners at various public locations, typically road bridges, and sometimes at 
spectacular heights. Within the organization, these types of stunt are called “Skorzeny 
operations”, referring to the German Nazi hero Otto Skorzeny, who famously liberated 
Mussolini from a mountain prison during a spectacular special operations rescue.  
More irregular types of activity include “sealing off” enemy buildings, using specially 
produced NRM-cordons, vigilante street patrols, and broadcasting confrontational phone 
pranks against people considered as political enemies, including the police and the security 
service. In its early days, NRM youth activists also carried out a handful of sabotage 
operations against art exhibitions because they thought these exhibitions were promoting 
pedophilia.  
The NRM sometimes combines legal action with threatening behavior. For example, 
after its controversial participation at the 2017 annual political gathering in Almedalen in 
Sweden, several Swedish officials wanted to ban the group from participating at next year’s 
convention. As a result, the NRM threatened to systematically harass the festival, should they 
not be allowed to participate (The Nordic Resistance Movement, 2018, pp. 257–258).  
More recently, the NRM has carried out a number of larger demonstrations, which to 
date have been organized legally in cooperation with the police. However, during several of 
these demonstrations, there have been violent clashes between NRM-activists and the police. 
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demonstrations, because it is not satisfied with the way the police have handled them (The 
Nordic Resistance Movement, 2018, pp. 258–264).  
From time to time, NRM members have also been involved in illegal activities, 
including violent attacks using weapons such as knives and explosives (some with deadly 
outcomes). Such activities are, of course, dismissed by the NRM leadership as something 
these activists have carried out on their own initiative. Interestingly, after some of these illegal 
actions, the NRM receives “exclusive” interviews from members of the self-titled “action 
groups” that claim to be behind them (see e.g. The Nordic Resistance Movement, 2018, p. 
120). One could speculate that the existence of such clandestine “action groups” may serve as 
a tool for the NRM to carry out illegal activities without compromising the organization.  
Compared to the NRM, GI’s action repertoire is more irregular and multifaceted. This 
stems partly from GI’s network-centric organizational structure, and partly from GI’s 
emphasis on creative countercultural (metapolitical) activism, leaving much of the initiative to 
each local group. Among the best-known internal activities are the annual Summer University 
training camp arranged by the French GI division, and activities organized at the various 
“Identity houses” that appear to be most common in France.  
Although GI’s external activities vary a lot, they are usually premised on the same 
basic idea: to carry out creative, spectacular, or provocative publicity stunts to generate media 
attention – a form of action referred to as guerrilla media tactics (Zúquete, 2018, p. 48). 
These stunts can range from small-scale street-based artistic displays or performances, via 
regular street patrols meant to protect the native population from violent foreigners, to 
symbolic “occupations” of buildings associated with political enemies or even large-scale 
operations such as the Defend Europa campaign in 2017. For this campaign, GI joined forces 
with other like-minded groups and used crowdfunding to charter a ship, which was 
subsequently used to intervene against rescue operations sent out to help refugees lost in the 
Mediterranean Sea. On a more regular basis, GI activists also organize flyer distributions, 
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Publicly, GI presents itself as a non-violent group, and violent confrontation with 
political enemies is not part of its daily action repertoire. At the same time, GI adheres to a 
war-like rhetoric alluding to violent images. Several publicity stunts orchestrated by the 
French GI contain elements of symbolic violence, for instance when they “occupy” mosques, 
carry out vigilante “patrols” to protect natives from immigrant “rabble” (racaille), seek to 
interfere with search-and-rescue vessels to “defend” Europe from migrants lost at sea, or 
“block” popular migrant routes through the Alps. 
However, GI activists are not restricted to imagined violence. For example, at their 
annual summer camps, newcomers are expected to participate in an initiation rite inspired by 
the movie Fight Club, in which they have to fight one of their own for one minute, while the 
crowd stands around cheering (Bouron, 2015, pp. 15–16). GI also organizes martial arts 
training for their members (Zúquete, 2018, pp. 59, 62), and from time to time, they experience 
violent confrontations with opposing anti-fascist groups – fights that are hailed and 
commemorated among GI members (Zúquete, 2018, pp. 336–337). Furthermore, French GI 
activists have proven to be quite violent when acting on their own, and even bragging about it 
to fellow GI activists (Al Jazeera, 2018). In the end, physical violence is not rejected 
altogether. As the GI-leader Delrieux stated in an interview with a Greek magazine: “We 
reject violence, but we will use force if necessary” (Generation Identity, 2013, p. 39).  
In sum, most of the activities carried out by the NRM and GI are legal, but for many 
members of the public deeply provocative. Considering that these are militant protest groups 
promoting the interests of certain races (the NRM), or ethnic groups (GI), that is to be 
expected. However, in the case of the NRM, legal activities such as protests and 
demonstrations often lead to violent confrontations with counter-protestors or the police. 
Although GI refrains from such violent confrontation, they do carry out various forms of civil 
disobedience, such as road blockages, compelling the police to deal with them forcefully. As 
such, both groups represent particular challenges to contemporary Western governments and 
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Concluding discussion: Six advice for preventing violence and extremism 
 
Using the above findings as a point of departure, this section offers advice on how policy-
makers and practitioners tasked to prevent violence and extremism might go about dealing 
with militant protest groups such as the NRM and GI without compromising liberal 
democratic principles.  
It should be noted that having extremist (or anti-democratic) ideas is not illegal per se 
in most liberal democracies, as long as the views are not translated into extremist behavior. 
This does not mean that extremist ideas are to be welcomed in a liberal democracy, or that 
governments cannot work systematically to prevent or minimize the prevalence of such ideas. 
However, trying to prevent or minimize extremism (ideas and behavior) is a delicate task that 
can easily backfire and lead to unintended consequences. One should therefore be careful 
about giving too specific advice about how certain measures might reduce extremist views or 
behavior, in particular because measures that have proven effective in one case do not 
necessarily apply to other cases, or to similar cases in different contexts.  
Although there is a vast academic literature on preventing violent extremism (see 
Stephens et al., 2019 for a review), this field of research suffers from an inherent challenge of 
isolating and documenting the effects of measures intended to reduce extremism, because 
meaningful control groups are hard to establish. Thus, considering the delicate and volatile 
effects from counterextremism measures, the following advice is kept at a general level, and 
tailored to groups such as the NRM and GI, i.e., militant protest groups mainly operating in 
the extra-parliamentary space and seeking to influence people through mostly legal yet 
sometimes disturbing and confrontational actions.  
 
1. Deny the role of heroic victim 
An essential element of the NRM’s and GI’s militant identities is that they – as true 
representatives of their peoples – have become victims of a malicious system trying to crush 
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heroic battle against “the system”. This romantic self-perception appears to be a strong 
motivator for many militant activists. Denying this role of heroic victim might therefore 
reduce some of the appeal these groups are benefiting from. Any initiative or reaction from 
the “the system” – i.e. the government – that might solidify the perception of being heroic 
victims, such as derogatory public labeling, unwarranted public arrests, or unannounced house 
searches at night, should therefore be considered against alternative measures that might be 
perceived as less intrusive or repressive.  
This does not mean that governments should not initiate measures against militant 
protest groups, or react promptly when their behavior crosses certain boundaries. Trying to 
deny their role as heroic victim should, for example, never be used as an excuse for not 
responding to illegal extremist behavior. However, there is likely to be benefit in always 
thinking hard about how certain initiatives or responses might affect these groups’ self-
perception, and whether alternative measures could do the same job but with less of a 
victimizing effect.  
 
2. Encourage responsible media coverage 
As militant protest groups trying to convey messages to larger audiences, both the NRM and 
GI thrive on media attention, including the negative kind. Both groups have become experts 
in making the most of any form of media attention, often with follow-up initiatives such as 
video-filmed personal confrontations or public responses. At the same time, the media’s 
interest in these groups is undeservedly high due to their controversial political messages. 
Minimizing media attention towards these groups would likely impact negatively on their 
recruitment and mobilization.  
However, in a liberal democracy, it is of course not acceptable to dictate what the 
media should or should not do. Therefore, perhaps the most viable option from a 
governmental perspective is to establish a dialogue with the media about the potential 
negative effects of disproportionate coverage of militant protest groups. All things considered, 
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3. Build knowledge about militant protest groups 
Valid, in-depth, and updated knowledge is needed to carry out informed assessments of how 
certain measures might impact on the self-perception and behavior of militant protest groups. 
Building, sustaining, and disseminating such knowledge may therefore contribute to more 
effective responses and initiatives, both outside and within governments. Poor understanding 
will lead to misinformed responses and initiatives that can easily backfire and lead to 
unintended consequences. For example, considering the fanaticism, experience, and position 
of well-established NRM leaders, home visits by the security police intended to warn them 
about their activism are not likely to have the desired effect.  
This type of knowledge has limited shelf-life and therefore requires some form of 
permanent structure designed to produce, update, and disseminate it. Furthermore, 
considering the radical nature of militant protest groups, those responsible for producing it 
should not represent interest groups with political agendas, but rather more “neutral” civil or 
government agencies. At the same time, because we are dealing mostly with legal actors here, 
these agencies should not operate clandestinely like intelligence agencies, but openly and in 
line with international privacy laws and regulations. 
 
4. Build knowledge about liberal democracy 
A shared denominator for the NRM and GI is their fierce opposition to liberal democracy. By 
implication, building knowledge about liberal democratic ideas and values could serve as a 
firewall against their anti-liberal propaganda. Many Western countries are currently 
experiencing an erosion of support for democratic systems, including among young people 
(Foa & Mounk, 2017). Some of this erosion may result from the fact that today’s young 
people have been born into fairly well-functioning democratic societies and have no 
experience of illiberal or authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracy can easily be taken for 
granted and even blamed for broader societal trends related to modernization and 
globalization. Some might also regard liberal democracy as a rather neutral and boring 
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human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of organization, freedom of religion, and the rule 
of law.  
For these reasons, contemporary liberal democratic governments have a responsibility 
to build knowledge about what liberal democracy essentially is, how and why it came about, 
and what its alternatives might entail. Ideally, liberal democracy should not be perceived as 
neutral and boring, but as an ideology worth defending. Making liberal democracy 
fashionable among young people may sound like a difficult task, but is one that should be 
striven towards.  
 
5. Recognize genuine concerns while dismissing extreme solutions 
Some concerns voiced by groups such as the NRM and GI are genuine in the sense that they 
are heartfelt by the activists and may also relate to actual societal challenges. For example, 
assuming that current patterns of demographic change continue, people of white ethnic decent 
will most likely be outnumbered by people of mixed ethnic background by the end of the 
century in several European countries (Kaufmann, 2018). Increasing ethnic/cultural 
heterogeneity may also impact negatively on social cohesion and social trust (Collier, 2013). 
These developments cause concern among considerable parts of the population in European 
countries (Goodwin, 2017). Such concerns must be recognized and discussed openly, without 
prejudice and moralization. At the same time, the extreme solutions proposed by groups such 
as NRM and GI, such as remigration, must also be brought into the light and criticized, not 
only as entirely unrealistic, but also as deeply problematic from a democratic point of view.  
 
6. React decisively to extremist and violent behavior  
Finally, although liberal democracies may have to tolerate illiberal or anti-democratic 
opinions, they must never extend this liberal attitude to tolerating extremist or violent 
behavior, especially when specific communities, groups, or citizens are being targeted 
systematically. In such instances, decisive reactions with real consequences are needed to 
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However, knowing precisely where to draw the line between tolerable extremist opinions and 
intolerable extremist behavior is not a straightforward exercise.  
To some extent, the law dictates the types of statements and behaviors that are 
intolerable such as direct threats, violent attacks, or causing public disorder. However, all 
laws are subject to interpretation, and some laws are vaguer and harder to enforce effectively 
than others. This is especially the case with hate crime laws. One reason is that the police will 
only be able to respond to a small proportion of hate crimes, either because they are not 
reported, or because they are difficult to prosecute. As a result, those few who get convicted 
may perceive their punishment as unfair and arbitrary. In addition, enforcing hate crime laws 
may produce unintended consequences, such as stronger internal group cohesion, further 
radicalization, and a sense of victimization. For example, NRM activists are regularly 
sentenced to prison using hate crime laws. However, the justifications for imprisonment are 
often vague and the sentences short. Serving short prison sentences appears to give status to 
activists within these groups, in particular if they perceive the conviction as unfair. Activists 
have (according to their own accounts) been imprisoned for a few months for posting a 
picture of the Star of David being thrown into a garbage can, and publishing statements such 
as “long live National Socialism!” Although explicit promotion of such views may be 
interpreted as illegal according to hate crime laws, one can easily bypass such laws by making 
the statement more implicit. The result is a cat-and-mouse interpretation game, which does 
not seem to have the intended preventive or protective effect, rather the contrary.  
Similar laws have been used in attempts to punish GI activists for expressing 
incitement to hatred. However, most of these accusations have been dismissed in court 
because a racist intent could not be proven, thereby boosting the confidence of the accused GI 
activists (Die Tagesstimme, 2018). Similarly, GI activists in Germany and Austria have been 
subjected to quite repressive measures by the state, including being put on surveillance, being 
prosecuted as a criminal organization, and having their homes raided and their funds 
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86). These types of measures might then only strengthen the notion of being heroic victims, 
unfairly targeted by a malicious system.  
Rather than policing political views, one should perhaps be more concerned with 
policing extremist and threatening behavior targeting specific individuals, groups, or 
communities. A recent documentary showed how French GI activists in their spare time seek 
out violent confrontations with random Muslims, including young girls, in the streets at night 
(Al Jazeera, 2018). This type of behavior should be reacted to decisively. On a similar note, 
the NRM has been harassing and threatening political opponents into silence at different 
locations in Sweden, apparently without any firm reactions from the police (Bjørgo & 
Ravndal, 2018).  
Precisely where the boundary for legal reactions should be situated remains an open 
question in need of further scrutiny. At the moment, we see legal reactions to controversial 
political views, which may lead to unintended consequences, and we see a lack of legal 
responses to extremist actions that are clearly overstepping the boundary of what our societies 
should tolerate. Well-informed analyses of where this boundary should be drawn remains an 
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